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The First Amendment Behind Bars: Free Exercise Claims Under RFRA and RLUIPA 
 
I. Introduction  
Throughout the 1980’s, prisoners enjoyed very little free exercise protection under Supreme 
Court precedent. The Supreme Court’s decisions were highly deferential to prison administrators, 
giving almost carte blanche control over regulation of the institution’s free exercise policies. 
Congress responded by enacting statutes requiring greater protection be given to free exercise of 
religion in prisons. This paper will track jurisprudence as it relates to those statutory schemes 
aimed at expanding prisoner free exercise rights. More specifically, it will analyze prisoners’ rights 
to free exercise under both federal statutes as it relates to the application of strict scrutiny standard 
of review in cases involving grooming and religious objects regulations. The central question is 
whether the application of strict scrutiny is actually beneficial toward prisoners bringing free 
exercise claims under these federal statutes.  
The two federal statutes at issue are the Religious Freedom Restoration Act1 (“RFRA”) and 
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 20002 (“RLUIPA”). After RFRA was 
struck down as applied to the states under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress 
enacted RLUIPA which, like its predecessor, reviewed prison policies restricting free exercise 
under the most searching standard of review, strict scrutiny. Although RLUIPA attempted to fix 
the shortcomings of RFRA, it was not until the landmark decision in Holt v. Hobbs3 where 
prisoners actually saw some relief. In Holt, the Court sent a clear signal that prison administrators 
would no longer receive deference as to the validity of regulations restricting religious practice 
and would be subject to a heavy burden of proof to show that religious accommodations could not 
 
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et. seq. 
2 42 U.S.C. §2000cc, et. seq. 
3 Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 353 (2015). 
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be made without endangering prison safety and security. This paper will discuss RFRA caselaw 
and both pre-Holt and post-Holt RLUIPA caselaw involving prisoner free exercise claims in the 
context of grooming and religious object regulations. An analysis of this caselaw will reveal that 
after Holt, prisoners have much greater success in bringing free exercise claims under RLUIPA.  
Prisoners are overwhelmingly more likely to succeed in cases involving grooming regulations as 
opposed to religious object regulations, but overall prisoners have greater protection of religious 
free exercise under these statutory schemes.  
II. Prisoner Rights  
a. Constitutional: Shabazz and Progeny  
While the desire to practice religion as an incarcerated individual in the United States is 
widespread, prisoners historically enjoyed slim constitutional protection of religious exercise.4 In 
the New Deal era, courts began to hear more constitutional claims against state prisons, but 
continued to show little interest in challenges to prison policies implicating free exercise.5 Starting 
in the 1960s, federal courts became more amenable to prisoner free exercise claims. In Cruz v. 
Beto, the Court held that a prison had a duty to provide its Muslim prisoners with a “reasonable 
opportunity” of pursing their faith.6 Prisoners enjoyed the highest level of First Amendment 
protection in the decade following Cruz, but judicial support behind prisoners’ free exercise claims 
disappeared in 1987 with the Court’s decision in O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz.7 In Shabazz, the 
Court rejected not only strict scrutiny but any kind of heightened scrutiny when reviewing prisoner 
 
4 Thomas P. O’Connor & Michael Perreyclear, Prison Religion in Action and Its Influence on Offender 
Rehabilitation, 35 J. OFFENDER REHAB. 11, 28 (2002).  
5 See Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483, 485 (5th Cir. 1952) (holding that “it is not the function of the [c]ourts to 
superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, but only to deliver from imprisonment those 
who are illegally confined”)  
6 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). 
7 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 353 (1987).  
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free exercise claims.8 The Court set forth a “reasonableness” standard, where the central question 
was whether “the prison’s action in burdening religious exercise was reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests.” Citing Turner v. Safley9, the Court laid down four factors to be 
used when determining reasonableness: (1) whether there is a “valid, rational connection” between 
the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest alleged and whether the connection 
is not so attenuated as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational; (2) whether inmates retain 
alternative means of exercising the circumscribed right; (3) the impact of accommodating the right 
on other prisoners, guards, and prison resources; and (4) whether there are alternatives to the 
regulation restricting exercise of religion that “fully accommodate the prisoner’s rights at de 
minimis cost to valid penological interests.”10 Through the use of this new approach, the Court 
made it clear that a high degree of deference was to be given to prison administrations.   
In another step in the seemingly wrong direction for prisoners’ rights, the Court issued its 
landmark decision in Employment Division v. Smith.11 Prior decisions, Sherbert v. Verner12 and 
Wisconsin v. Yoder,13 both  outside of the prison context, had subjected all laws that substantially 
burdened religious exercise to a strict scrutiny standard of review14, but the Court in Smith held 
that this more exacting standard of review applied only to laws that were not generally applicable, 
involved individualized exemptions and what the Smith Court called “hybrid rights.”15 
 
8 Id. 
9 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987). This case narrowly construed the due process rights of prisoners. 
10 Id.  
11 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).  
12 Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).  
13 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972). 
14 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (“where fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake…we 
must searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to promote…and the impediment to those objectives that 
would flow from recognizing the claimed exception”); Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (“any incidental 
burden on the free exercise…may be justified by a compelling state interest…). 
15 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82 (actions “involving not only the Free Exercise alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in 
conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as the freedom of speech and of the press…or the right of 
parents to direct the education of their children…”). 
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b. Statutory: RFRA and RLUIPA  
In response to the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith, Congress enacted RFRA in November 
of 1993.16 RFRA attempted to overrule the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith and restore the true 
compelling interest test from the Sherbert and Yoder line of jurisprudence.17 Substantively, RFRA 
allowed a for substantial burden on free exercise only if the government could prove that the 
burden was in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and was the least restrictive 
means of furthering that compelling interest.18 In other words, RFRA established a strict scrutiny 
standard of review for any law or regulation which substantially burdened religious exercise. In 
fact, the legislative history of RFRA revealed clear legislative intent that courts apply strict 
scrutiny to prisoner free exercise claims.19 
Only four years after its passage, RFRA was struck down as applied to the states in City of 
Boerne v. Flores.20  Sent back to the drawing board, Congress sought to draft legislation that would 
withstand what the Boerne Court identified as constitutional deficiencies.21  This culminated in 
2000 with the passage of RLUIPA.22 To avoid running into the same issues as RFRA, RLUIPA 
was intended to narrowly address “those areas of law where the congressional record of religious 
 
16 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et. seq.  
17 See 42 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, 2000bb-1. 
18 Id. 
19 See S. REP. NO. 103-111, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1899 (stating intent to restore "protection 
afforded to prisoners to observe their religions” which was undermined by Shabazz decision).  See also 139 CONG. 
REC. S14,465 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("Exposure to religion is the best hope we have 
for rehabilitation of a prisoner. Most prisoners, like it or not, will eventually be returning to our communities."). 
20 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (holding that RFRA exceeded Congress’ Section 5 rights 
under the Fourteenth Amendment by defining rights rather than enforcing them). 
21 Id.   
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. This paper will not discuss RLUIPA as it relates to land use, that topic is outside of the scope 
of this comment. 
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discrimination and discretionary burden was the strongest: laws governing institutionalized 
persons and land use laws.” 23 Section 3 of RLUIPA24 states as follows: 
(A) GENERAL RULE: No government shall impose a substantial burden on the 
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution, as 
defined in section 2 of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (42 
U.S.C. 1997) even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, 
unless the government demonstrates that the imposition of the burden on that 
person: 
1. Is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and  
2. Is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
government interest 
(B) SCOPE OF APPLICATION: This section applies in any case which:  
1. The substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that 
receives Federal financial assistance; or  
2. The substantial burden affects, or removal of the substantial burden 
would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several 
states, or with Indian tribes.25 
Thus, under RLUIPA if the prisoner succeeds in making a prima facie showing that his 
religious exercise was substantially burdened, RLUIPA shifts the burden to the defendant prison 
officials to demonstrate their decision satisfies strict scrutiny–that burdening free exercise is the 
least restrictive means to furthering the state’s compelling interest.26 
III. Supreme Court Interpretations of the Statutes  
Supreme Court interpretations of both RFRA and RLUIPA demonstrate a remarkable 
protectiveness over free exercise. In decisions like Gonzales27, Hobby Lobby28 and Holt29, the 
Court reads statutory strict scrutiny to be sweepingly protective of religious exercise. While the 
mandate from the Court was clear, lower court decisions reflect confusion on the accurate 
 
23 Roman P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: 
A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional Zoning Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929, 944 (2001).  
24 42 U.S.C. §2000cc(a)-(b).  
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
27 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
28 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
29 Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 353 (2015). 
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application of these statutes. Confusion resulted from hesitancy to apply a potent strict scrutiny 
standard of review given persistent pressure to defer to prison officials and perennial concerns 
about prison safety and security, as well as questions as to the constitutionality of the statutes. 
These concerns were laid to rest after careful Supreme Court attention in Cutter30, where RLUIPA 
was ruled constitutional, and Holt, where the Court clearly explained the role of prison 
administration in free exercise cases. With these decisive questions answered, lower court 
treatment of free exercise claims has shifted in prisoners’ favor over the last five years.  
a. RFRA 
The Supreme Court read RFRA as vastly protective of religious free exercise. The first 
signal of this protectiveness came in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do 
Vegetal.31 There, customs inspectors intercepted a shipment of hoasca, a sacramental tea 
containing dimethyltryptamine (“DMT”), an illegal hallucinogen.32 The shipment was traced to O 
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal (“UDV”), a Christian Spiritist sect originating in 
Brazil, with an American branch containing 130 members.33 It was the UDV’s religious practice 
to receive the sacrament of Communion through hoasca.34 The UDV argued that the seizure of the 
hoasca violated RFRA.35 In fending off attacks from the government which craftily argued for the 
Court to apply a more watered-down version of strict scrutiny36, the Court reinforced the 
 
30 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
31 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 425-426 (2006). 
32 Id.  
33 Id.   
34 Id. 
35 Although not within the prison-context of this paper, the Gonzales case has one of the most succinct analyses of 
true strict scrutiny. Lower courts applying RFRA did not seem to follow the clear mandate set out in this case.  
36 The government attempted to argue that placement of DMT on Schedule 1 of the Controlled Substances Act as 
having a “high potential for abuse” by users “precludes any consideration of individualized exceptions such as that 
sought by the UDV.” The government argued that a flat-out ban was the least restrictive means of furthering the 
compelling government interest of public safety. In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that the compelling 
interest must be satisfied against application of the challenged law to the particular claimant whose sincere belief is 
being religiously burdened” which was not satisfied here since the Court must “look beyond broadly formulated 
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proposition that “Congress’ express decision to legislate the compelling interest test indicates that 
RFRA challenges should be adjudicated in the same manner as constitutionally mandated 
applications of the test…” which requires the Court to “look beyond the broadly formulated 
interests justifying the general applicability of government mandates and scrutinize the asserted 
harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.”37 
The second relevant interpretation of RFRA which called for a true strict scrutiny test was 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores.38 At issue in this case was an HHS regulation that demanded 
corporations to provide coverage for methods of contraception which violated the religious beliefs 
of the owners.39 The Court began its discussion by reinforcing the idea that “the least restrictive 
means standard is exceptionally demanding.”40 What makes this case broadly protective of free 
exercise is the Court’s delineation of alternatives which would have been “certainly less restrictive 
of the plaintiff’s religious liberties.”41 The fact that the Court illustrated a list of alternatives to the 
religiously burdensome policy at issue signals sweeping protection of free exercise.  
b. RLUIPA  
RLUIPA was intended to be similarly protective of religious exercise. As a threshold 
matter, RLUIPA does not define “compelling government interest” or “least restrictive means,” 
but these terms have garnered an established meaning in constitutional jurisprudence.42 The Court 
 
interests” and there was no indication that Congress, in classifying DMT, considered the harms posed by the 
particular use at issue, sacramental use of hoasca by the UDV. Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 430-433. 
37 Id. 
38 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
39 Id. at 689-90.  
40 Id. at 728. 
41 Id. The court notes that “the most straightforward” way of achieving the government’s goal would be for the 
government to assume the cost of providing the contraceptives to any women unable to obtain them under their 
health insurance policies due to religious objections of their employer. The court noted a second option was the 
creation of an entirely new government program to achieve the same goals.  
42 Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA At Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of RLUIPA’S Prisoner 
Provisions, 28 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 501 (2005). See also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 
508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (“To satisfy the commands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious practice 
must advance interests of the highest order and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests”).  
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has reinforced just how searching of an inquiry this is. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court stated that 
compelling interests must be interests of only the “highest order.”43 In Sherbert v. Verner, the 
Court stated that “only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for 
permissible limitation.”44 The Court has further emphasized this point by adding that where strict 
scrutiny applies and the government must set forth a true compelling interest, the test “is not 
watered…down” and that it “…really means what it says.”45 
In terms of narrow tailoring, the Court has noted that a “searching inquiry” is required 
where the onus is on the government to prove that “no alternative forms” of regulation could serve 
the asserted interest without infringing on the protected right.46 The regulation should be struck 
down under strict scrutiny where the government’s compelling interest could be achieved by 
“narrower ordinances that burden religion to a far lesser degree.”47 In other words, if there is but 
one other reasonable alternative with a lesser degree of intrusiveness on free exercise, the 
challenged regulation cannot stand.  
Predictably, the constitutionality of RLUIPA was also challenged. This challenge came in 
2005 in Cutter v. Wilkinson, where Ohio prisoners sued under RLUIPA alleging free exercise 
violations of non-mainstream religions due to denial of access to literature, group worship, and 
other ceremonial items.48 RLUIPA was challenged as unconstitutional on the grounds that the 
statute “improperly advances religion in violation of the…Establishment Clause.”49 The case rose 
to the Supreme Court after the Sixth Circuit issued an opinion condemning RLUIPA.50 The 
 
43 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 205, 215 (1972).  
44 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). 
45 Id.  
46 Id. at 407.  
47 Id. 
48 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005).  
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
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Supreme Court reversed, citing prior decisions where the Court held that the “government 
may…accommodate religious practices…without violating the Establishment Clause” given 
“room for play in the joints” between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, allowing the 
government to accommodate religion beyond Free Exercise requirements without offending the 
Establishment Clause.51 
While the holding of Cutter was a step in the right direction for prisoners, the Court alluded 
to a proposition which had previously led to apprehensive treatment by lower courts applying 
RFRA. After affirming RLUIPA’s constitutionality, the court doubled back by saying, “we do not 
read RLUIPA to elevate accommodation of religious observances over an institution’s need to 
maintain order and safety…an accommodation must be measured so that it does not override other 
significant interests.”52 The Court added that, “[w]hile the Act adopts a ‘compelling governmental 
interest’ standard, ‘context matters’ in the application of that standard.”53 The Court cited support 
from lawmakers dating back to RFRA’s passage that “courts would apply the Act’s standard with 
“due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing 
necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline consistent 
with consideration of costs and limited resources.”54 As will be seen in the following section, this 
dictum proved damaging to prisoner’s free exercise claims under RFRA and set the stage for the 
same quasi-strict scrutiny review during the beginning stages of RLUIPA. 
c. Holt v. Hobbs  
The Holt v. Hobbs decision was nothing short of instrumental for prisoner’s free exercise 
rights under RLUIPA. In Holt, a Muslim inmate challenged an Arkansas Department of 
 
51 Id. at 713-14.  
52 Id. at 722.  
53 Id. at 723.  
54 Id. at 723. See 139 Cong. Rec. 26190 (1993) (remarks of Sen. Hatch); S. Rep. No. 103-111 at 10. 
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Corrections grooming policy which prohibited inmates from growing beards.55 The policy had no  
religious exemptions, but did contain an exemption for inmates with a diagnosed dermatological 
condition who were permitted to wear facial hair no longer than one-quarter of an inch.56 The 
petitioner sought permission to grow a beard that was one-half inch long but was denied, and 
subsequently brought suit in district court under RLUIPA.57  The Magistrate Judge opined that 
“prison officials are entitled to deference” and that “the grooming policy allowed petitioner to 
exercise his religion in other ways, such as by praying on a prayer rug, maintaining the diet 
required by his faith, and observing religious holidays” and recommended that the preliminary 
injunction against the policy be vacated.58 The district court adopted the recommendation in full 
and it was subsequently affirmed by the Sixth Circuit.59 The Supreme Court reversed, and in doing 
so, finally gave inmates the momentum they needed in order to succeed on RLUIPA claims.  
This decision changed the course of prisoner’s free exercise claims under RLUIPA for two 
main reasons. First, the Holt Court makes it clear they are applying strict scrutiny, as opposed to 
the quasi-strict scrutiny which lower courts had long been applying dating back to RFRA. In Holt, 
the Court refused to accept the argument that the DOC’s compelling interest in safety and security 
of the prison would be compromised by allowing an inmate to grow a beard that is one-half inch 
in size, calling it an argument that is “hard to take seriously.”60 Secondly, and most importantly, 
the Court firmly addressed the dicta set out ten years earlier in Cutter:  
The magistrate Judge, the District Court and the Court of Appeals all thought 
that they were bound to defer to the Department’s assertion that allowing 
petitioner to grow such a beard would undermine its interest in suppressing 
contraband. RLUIPA, however, does not permit such unquestioning deference. 
 
55 Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 353, 356 (2015).  
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 359.  
58 Id. at 360.  
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 363.  
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RLUIPA, like RFRA, “makes clear that it is the obligation of the courts to 
consider whether exceptions are required under the test set forth by Congress.” 
That test requires the Department not merely to explain why it denied the 
exemption but to prove that denying the exemption is the least restrictive means 
of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Prison official are experts in 
running prisons and evaluating the likely effects of altering prison rules, and 
courts should respect that expertise. But that respect does not justify the 
abdication of the responsibility, conferred by Congress, to apply RLUIPA’s 
rigorous standard. And without a degree of deference that is tantamount to 
unquestioning acceptance, it is hard to swallow the argument that denying 
petitioner a one-half inch beard actually furthers the Department’s interest in 
rooting out contraband.61 
 
Importantly, the Holt decision is not isolated, but rather is built on precedent from Gonzales62 
and Hobby Lobby63. The idea of statutorily mandated strict scrutiny had always been a concept 
continuously reinforced by the Court and was only further intensified in Holt by the Court’s signal 
that blind deference to prison administrators is not the correct way to apply RLUIPA.64  
IV. Lower Court Case Law on Grooming and Religious Objects Under Statutes 
While the Supreme Court has, in Gonzales, Hobby Lobby, and again in Holt, made clear that 
claims brought under RFRA and RLUIPA which state a prima facie case are to be reviewed under 
strict scrutiny, what was actually applied by lower courts was nothing of the sort.  
a. RFRA 
While hindsight is 20/20, it is clear that RFRA failed to live up to its potential to improve 
prisoners’ free exercise rights. Lower courts applied RFRA in such a way that 90% of all prisoner 
claims filed under RFRA did not succeed.65 It is important to note that a large majority of 
unsuccessful RFRA claims failed at the outset because the burden on religious exercise was not 
 
61 Id. at 364 (emphasis added).  
62 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).  
63 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
64 Holt, 574 U.S. at 364. 
65 Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 575, 607-17 (1998).  
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found to be a substantial.66 In other words, the claimants failed in making out a prima facie showing 
under RFRA.67 However, out of the cases which did succeed at the outset, most ultimately still 
failed in the application of strict scrutiny.  
There are two main factors attributable to RFRA’s harsh application to prisoner free 
exercise claims. First, uncertainty surrounding the constitutionality of RFRA was present since 
shortly after its enactment.68 This led lower courts to approach RFRA cases apprehensively as an 
initial matter. Second, many courts approached RFRA cases with legislative intent that due 
deference still be provided to prison officials.69 Lower courts also did not have guidance from 
decisions like Gonzales or Hobby Lobby, which were not only aggressively protective of free 
exercise but also called for a very specific look at the possible problems caused by an exemption 
and the possible alternatives.70 The product of these factors was a quasi-strict scrutiny analysis 
applied to prisoner’s RFRA claims under which the institution almost always prevailed.  
Almost all RFRA claims surviving past the substantial burden stage were subject to this 
quasi-strict scrutiny. The first example of this came in Arguello v. Duckworth.71 There, the Seventh 
 
66 Id. 
67 This paper analyzes free exercise claims under RFRA and RLUIPA only as it relates to the application of strict 
scrutiny standard of review, so an analysis of why these cases failed under the prima facie showing of a substantial 
burden on religious exercise is outside the scope of this paper. See Haff v. Cooke, 923 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Wis. 
1996) (seizure of inmate’s white supremacist books was not a substantial burden); Lemay v. Dubois, No. CIV. A. 
95-11912-PBS, 1996 WL 463680 (D. Mass. July 29, 1996) (preventing inmate from accessing spiritual medallion, 
feathers, sage, and cedar was not a substantial burden); Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817 (8th Cir. 1997) (preventing access 
to Protestant books was not a substantial burden); Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69 (5th Cir. 1997) (ban on length of hair 
and possession of sacred materials was not a substantial burden); Bruton v. McGinnis, 110 F.3d 63 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(denial of access to Christian objects was not a substantial burden).  
68 Scott C. Idleman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Pushing the Limits of Legislative Power, 73 Tex. L. 
Rev. 247, 296 (1994) (positing that RFRA would be found to be unconstitutional under Section Five of the 
Fourteenth amendment only one year after the statute was passed).  
69 139 Cong. Rec. 26190 (1993) (remarks of Sen. Hatch); S. Rep. No. 103-111 at 10. 
70 See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 430-433 (“the compelling interest must be satisfied against application of the 
challenged law to the particular claimant whose sincere belief is being religiously burdened” which was not satisfied 
here since the Court must “look beyond broadly formulated interests” and there was no indication that Congress, in 
classifying DMT, considered the harms posed by the particular use at issue”). See also Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 
728 (listing alternatives “certainly” less restrictive on plaintiff’s religious exercise).  
71 Arguello v. Duckworth, No. 95-1222, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 445 (7th Cir. Jan. 9, 1997).  
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Circuit upheld a prison’s flat ban on Native American sacred herbs.72 The court accepted the at 
face-value assertion that the flat ban was the least restrictive way to prevent contraband from 
entering the prison, without exploring if other alternatives were actually less restrictive.73 The 
court’s inquiry ended shortly after it began when the court said, “there is no evidence in the record 
before us that Duckworth has not utilized the least restrictive means available to further these 
compelling interests.” 74 The court failed to distinguish between lack of evidence and less 
restrictive alternatives by failing to require the prison to actually explore ways to further their 
compelling interests with less burdensome restrictions.  
In George v. Sullivan, the court failed to analyze whether a flat ban on religious reading 
was in fact the least restrictive means to furthering prison safety,75 and in Reimann v. Murphy, the 
court even denied the offered alternative of redacting parts of the religious literature as opposed to 
a flat ban because it would leave nothing more than “sentence fragments.”76  In Harris v. Chapman, 
the court held that an ambiguously drawn prison regulation prohibiting prisoners from having 
longer than “medium length” hair was the least restrictive means of furthering prison security, 
without even defining what length constituted “medium length” and thus not considering if any 
lesser restrictive alternatives could have achieved that same goal.77 
Even with a more defined hair regulation of three inches, a prisoner was still denied an 
exemption in Davie v. Wingard when the court stated that the legislative history behind RFRA 
“shows that Congress intended for Courts to defer to the judgment of prison officials in matters of 
security and discipline.”78 The court even went on to say that “it could be argued that Defendants 
 
72 Id. at *2. 
73 Id. at *8.  
74 Id.  
75 George v. Sullivan, 896 F. Supp. 895, 898 (W.D. Wis. 1995).  
76 Reimann v. Murphy, 897 F. Supp.  398, 403 (E.D. Wis. 1995).  
77 Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 504 (11th Cir. 1996).  
78 Davie v. Wingard, 958 F. Supp. 1244, 1250 (S.D. Ohio.  1997).  
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could serve these goals my maintaining a policy which prohibits long hair but provides exemptions 
for religious genuine religious beliefs…” but afforded so much deference to the prison official’s 
argument that the flat ban was the least restrictive means because exemptions would “greatly 
complicate” the jobs of the corrections officers, and upheld the restriction anyway.79 In Rust v. 
Clarke, the court once again found that “haircutting” generally was the least restrictive means of 
furthering prison security, without investigating any alternative way to further such interest and 
dismissing alternatives as “impractical.”80 
Finally, In Hamilton v. Schriro, the court did not even apply strict scrutiny at all, stating 
that “we find the ‘no greater than necessary’ requirement to be functionally synonymous with the 
‘least restrictive means’ prong of the RFRA text when applied in the prison context.”81  It is notable 
that courts hearing RFRA cases cited the legislative history82 rather than the actual text of the 
statute when applying the compelling interest and least restrictive means standards. With the 
opportunity to rely on legislative intent as opposed to the plain meaning of the statute, courts were 
able to use RFRA to water down strict scrutiny and apply a standard of review somewhere in the 
middle, without inquiry into whether the restrictive policies could actually be adjusted in a way to 
allow prisoner free exercise as well as safety and security inside prison walls, producing across-
the-board unconquerable obstacles for prisoners.  
 
79 Id. at 1251.  
80 Rust v. Clarke, 89 F.3d 841, 845 (8th Cir. 1996).  
81 Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d. 1545, 1554 (8th Cir.  1996). 
82 Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69, 73 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting S.Rep. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11, reprinted 
in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1900). The Senate report reflects the following notion: “the committee expects that 
courts will continue the tradition of giving due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail 
administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security, and discipline 
consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.” See also Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 593 
(1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Madison v. Ritter, 240 F. Supp. 2d 566, 578 n.10 (W.D. Va. 2003), overruled on 
other grounds 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003) ("Some courts, in examining prison regulations under RFRA and 
RLUIPA, have softened the compelling interest test to allow speculative administrative judgments concerning 
security and cost to suffice to allow the regulation to survive strict scrutiny . . . It is also an approach that is 
dangerous for the protection of the constitutional rights of individuals outside of prison. Watering down strict 
scrutiny in a result-oriented manner in the prison context could subvert its rigor in other fields where it is applied”).  
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b. RLUIPA Pre-Holt  
Following RLUIPA’s passage, courts faced many of the same application problems that 
existed under RFRA. Pre-Holt decisions still reflected reliance on Cutter’s dictum and what many 
courts viewed as a limited decision-making role so as not to substitute the court’s judgment over 
that of prison officials. As a result, the majority of prisoner RLUIPA claims, although analyzed 
under “strict scrutiny,” still failed as a result of the same issues as RFRA cases. 
i. Grooming restrictions  
While challenges to grooming regulations had more success as opposed to object 
regulations, pre-Holt challenges in this area still experienced the same issues as RFRA era cases.  
In Ickstadt v. Dretke, a Texas appellate court accepted the prison’s argument that a flat out “no-
beard” policy was the least restrictive means to further the prison’s interest in safety and security 
by lessening any risk of hidden contraband hidden in the beards.83 The court accepted this position 
even though prisoners with medical conditions were allowed to grow beards.84 Allowing prisoners 
to maintain beards for medical reasons but not for religious ones completely undermined the 
prison’s argument for a compelling interest, but by granting such deference to the prison wardens, 
the court nonetheless ruled in the institution’s favor.  
Another example of watered-down strict scrutiny came in Limbaugh v. Thompson, where 
an Alabama district court held that a Native American prisoner’s challenge to hair length 
regulations could not succeed.85 The district court similarly applied a modified strict scrutiny test 
which only required a showing that the defendant-prison “articulated legitimate reasons-based on 
 
83 Ickstadt v. Dretke, No. H-02 1064, slip op. at 20 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2004).   
84 Id.  
85 Limbaugh v. Thompson, No. 93-D-1404-N, slip op. at 2 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 29, 2003).  
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compelling interest in prison safety and security” rather than asking the defendants to show that 
the regulation was the least restrictive means to further a compelling government interest.86  
 In Longoria v. Dretke, a Native American prisoner challenged a grooming policy requiring 
prisoners to maintain short hair.87 The Fifth Circuit, relying on a RFRA case in the same 
jurisdiction88 involving a similar restriction, found that longer hair “facilitates” the transfer of 
contraband and weapons and that requiring “prisoners to have short hair” makes it more difficult 
for escaped prisoners to alter their appearance.89 Like many of the RFRA cases in this area, the 
Fifth Circuit did not even attempt to explore less restrictive alternatives like allowing prisoners to 
maintain longer hair at a certain length.90 Once again, the court drew on notions of deference even 
before RLUIPA’s enactment, saying, “in enacting RFRA, Congress intended to continue to extend 
substantial deference to prison officials in legitimate security matters.”91 It is telling that courts, 
even in the age of RLUIPA, still refer back to and cite RFRA cases and legislative intent behind 
the enactment of RFRA to decide RLUIPA matters.92 This demonstrates that the deference given 
to prison officials neared blind acceptance, which set in motion the same events seen in RFRA 
cases: deference, a failure to apply true strict scrutiny, and prisoner defeat.  
In Smith v. Ozmint, a South Carolina district court upheld a one-inch hair length policy 
with no religious exemptions premised on maintaining prison safety and security.93 The court 
determined that the plaintiff-prisoner would not succeed on the merits of his RLUIPA claim and 
denied a preliminary injunction finding that “the court must defer to the prison official’s testimony 
 
86 Id. 
87 Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898, 900 (5th Cir. 2007).  
88 Diaz v. Collins, 114 F.3d 69, 73 (5th Cir. 1997).  
89 Longoria, 507 F.3d at 902.  
90 Id. at 904.  
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 Smith v. Ozmint, 444 F. Supp. 2d 502, 509. (D. South Car. 2006).  
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that the old policy has become cumbersome and impossible.”94 This grant of deference to prison 
officials came just a paragraph after the court opined that, “…it is far from clear that the SCDC 
Policy will be found to be the least restrictive means available.” Even in light of this, the court 
continued, “[n]onetheless, the court agrees with the magistrate that Plaintiff does make the 
showing of a likelihood of success necessary to justify a preliminary injunction…”95   
In Johnson v. McCann, an Illinois district court upheld a grooming policy which “prohibits 
hairstyles, including facial hair, which present a…security risk.”96 The court held that this policy 
satisfied the least restrictive alternative test, because the plaintiff himself did not provide any 
alternatives.97 However, the court provided its own alternative, stating that “regular individual 
inspections of inmates with long hair would prove a less restrictive means of maintaining prison 
safety…” but upholding the policy because “it would not adequately address the legitimate safety 
concerns of prison officials.”98  Here, we see the court offering its own less restrictive alternative 
and still upholding the restriction not based on the prison’s actual exploration of such alternatives, 
but solely on testimony from prison officials. Districts including Pennsylvania99, Virginia100, West 
Virginia101, South Carolina102, and Georgia103 and various Circuit courts including the Fourth104, 
Sixth105, Eighth106 and Eleventh107 have identical holdings.  
ii. Religious objects restrictions  
 
94 Id.   
95 Id. 
96 Johnson v. McCann. No. 08-C-4684, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51998 at *15 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2010).  
97 Id. at *16.  
98 Id.  
99 Scott v. Beard, No. 3:02-CV-0691, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65683 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2006).  
100 Ragland v. Angelone, 420 F. Supp. 2d 507 (W.D. Va. 2006).  
101 Scible v. Miller, No. 1:05CV166, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51002 (N.D. Wv. Jul. 25, 2006).  
102 Bailey v. Ozmint, No. 4:08-1630-HFF-TER, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87885 (D. Sc. 2010).  
103 Daker v. Wherington, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (N.D.Ga. 2007).  
104 McRae v. Johnson, 261 Fed. Appx. 554 (4th Cir. 2008).  
105 Hoevenaar v. Lazaroff, 422 F.3d 366, (6th Cir. 2005).  
106 Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2008).  
107 Brunskill v. Boyd, 141 Fed. Appx. 771 (11th Cir. 2005).  
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In the context of regulations which restricted use of religious objects, plaintiffs encountered 
much of the same difficulty in providing proof strong enough to overcome the deference given to 
prison administrators. We see the courts getting quite crafty in side-stepping application of true 
strict scrutiny review, instead focusing on technicalities in the facts of the cases and playing up 
safety and security concerns of prisons.  
In Davis v. Abercrombie, the plaintiff’s prayer object108 was confiscated for security 
purposes.109 The plaintiff argued that the prison could have used less burdensome alternatives as 
opposed to a confiscation, such as placing the object in the chaplain’s custody or keeping it in a 
clear Ziploc bag, preventing concealment and allowing prison officials to inspect the item without 
touching it.110 Even after the Hawaii district court cited precedent from RLUIPA stating that prison 
administrators must “show that they actually considered and rejected the efficacy of less restrictive 
measures before adopting the challenged practice,”111 such evidence is nowhere to be found in the 
opinion. Instead, when determining if the prison used the least restrictive means, the court pointed 
to the plaintiff’s failure to list his prayer object on a required Inventory Form, and testimony from 
prison officials that confiscating the religious object was their only option.112  The court inquired 
into why the prison officials took the action they did but not whether that action was the least 
restrictive means of preserving prison safety. By relying so heavily on the testimony from prison 
officials, the court failed to apply the second prong of strict scrutiny with the bite mandated by 
RLUIPA. District courts of Virginia, Texas and Alabama have applied the same analysis.113   
 
108 Davis v. Abercrombie, 903 F. Supp. 2d 975, 981 (D. Haw. 2012). The prayer object was a small cloth pouch, 
which contained a kuki nut.  
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 Id. at 1001.  
112 Id. at 1002-03.  
113 See Holley v. Johnson, No. 7:08CV00629, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65356, at *17 (W.D. Va. Jun. 30, 2010 
(because inmate did not argue his religious materials were not security threats, and he could “exercise” his religion 
in other ways, a flat ban promoted safety and security interests in the least burdensome way). See also Thunderhose 
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In Fowler v. Crawford114, a Native American inmate filed a RLUIPA claim after being 
denied the items needed to make a sweat lodge.115  The plaintiff relied on the correctional facility’s 
history of successfully operating a sweat lodge for over a decade without incident, and argued that 
in light of this, a flat ban was not the least restrictive means of furthering the prison’s security 
interests.116 The defendants argued that they had met their burden in exploring alternatives by 
offering the plaintiff an outdoor area to “smoke a ceremonial pipe” and practice “other aspects of 
his Native American faith.”117 The plaintiff rejected these options, arguing that nothing short of a 
sweat lodge would allow him to properly practice his religion.118 When evaluating whether a less 
restrictive alternative existed, the court relied on the Plaintiff’s rejection to “practice” his religion 
using  “other aspects” instead of whether lesser restrictive alternatives existed to a flat out ban on 
the sweat lodge itself.119 The court also cited Cutter, claiming that “Cutter counsels restraint in this 
realm…to provide due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail 
administrators.”120 Once again, the Eighth Circuit and others121 replace deference with blind 
loyalty to prison officials and in doing so, misapply the second prong of strict scrutiny.  
c. RLUIPA Post-Holt  
The Holt decision marked a turning point in prisoner free exercise jurisprudence. By 2015, 
prisoners began to experience more success in free exercise claims. As will be further discussed, 
 
v. Pierce, 418 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (inmate could “exercise” his religion in other ways therefore the ban 
on religious objects was the least restrictive); Presley v. Scott, No. 4:13-cv-02067, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173464, 
at *30 (N.D. Al. Sept. 5, 2014) (following the reasoning of Pierce).   
114 Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931, 939 (8th Cir. 2008). 
115 These items included split wood, large scalding rocks, deer antlers, and an enclosed area.  
116 Id. at 938-39.  
117 Id. at 940.  
118 Id.  
119 Id.  
120 Id. at 941.  
121 See also Hyde v. Fisher, 146 Idaho 782 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009) (adopting Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Fowler); 
Alvarez v.  Hill, No. CV-04-884-BR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12637 (D. Or. Feb. 12, 2010).  
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this is attributable to the Holt Court “setting the record straight” that courts are not to apply blind 
acceptance to unsubstantiated assertions by prison officials as to the viability of less restrictive 
alternatives. With this clarity, lower courts were no longer able to take prison officials at their 
word and began holding the institutions accountable for failure to explore possible alternatives.  
i. Grooming  
Prisoners experienced the greatest level of success in post-Holt RLUIPA challenges to 
grooming restrictions. A prime example of the Holt mandate at play came in Ware v. La. Dep’t of 
Corrections, where a Rastafari prisoner challenged a Louisiana state prison restriction prohibiting 
prisoners from wearing dreadlocks.122 Citing Holt, the Fifth Circuit stated that “the least restrictive 
means standard is exceptionally demanding, and it requires the government to show that it lacks 
other means of achieving its desired goal other than the challenged policy.”123 On the issue of 
deference, the Fifth Circuit continued, “in the face of contrary policies, we may not defer to prison 
officials ‘mere say-so’ that they could not accommodate the plaintiff’s request because other 
policies indicate a less restrictive means may be available.”124 Against a backdrop drastically 
different than RFRA and RLUIPA policies which cited only the legislative history behind the 
statutes, the court rejected the prison’s argument that budget and staffing cuts prevented the prison 
from performing hair inspections.125 The prison provided the same assertions regarding safety and 
security that had long passed muster in the pre-Holt era, but the court rejected these claims, 
reasoning that given evidence that the majority of jurisdictions have a more lenient policy on the 
issue, the prison was required to “offer persuasive reasons for the disparity” which it failed to do, 
 
122 Ware v. La. Dep’t of Corr., 866 F.3d. 263, 266 (5th Cir. 2017).  
123 Id. at 269.  
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 273.  
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and as such it failed to show that the grooming policies were the least restrictive means.126  Many 
other district courts including Georgia127, Florida128, Arizona129, New Jersey130, Louisiana131, 
Illinois132, and Kentucky133 have issued opinions with the same reasoning, all resulting in a 
prisoner victory against the challenged grooming policy.   
In Casey v. Davis, a Texas district court similarly upheld a challenge to a grooming policy 
prohibiting the plaintiff from wearing a kouplock134 and smoking a prayer pipe while wearing a 
religiously significant “medicine bag.”135 When applying strict scrutiny, the court emphasized that 
deference owed to prison officials “is not unlimited…and policies grounded on mere speculation, 
exaggerated fears, or post-hoc rationalizations will not suffice to meet the Act’s requirements.”136 
The court acknowledged that in a pre-Holt era both the grooming religious object  policies could 
prove to be the least restrictive means, but following Holt, courts must analyze the policy in light 
of the individual circumstances of the claimant.137  The court considered the plaintiff’s status as a 
low security risk inmate, and the fact that the prison had not affirmatively demonstrated that a total 
ban on the ability to wear a kouplock and use the prayer pipe and medicine bag was the least 
restrictive way to maintain security.138 The court in Cobb v. Morris issued an opinion with the 
same reasoning one year later.139 
 
126 Id. at 274.  
127 Smith v. Dozier, No. 5:12-cv26, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS  227681 (M.D. Ga.  May 21, 2018).  
128 Sims v. Jones, No. 4:16-cv-49, 2018 U.S. Dist. 54652 (N.D.  Fla. Mar. 1, 2018).  
129 Sprouse. v.  Ryan, 346 F. Supp. 3d 1347 (D. Az. Dec. 7, 2017).   
130 Abdul-Aziz v. Lanigan, No. 17-2806, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106718 (D.N.J. Jun. 18, 2020) 
131 Milon v. Leblanc, No.  19-717-BAJ, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS. 199344 (M.D. La. Aug. 14, 2020).  
132 Johnson v. Baldwin, No. 18-cv-1374, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172669 (S.D. Ill.  Oct. 5, 2018). 
133 Luther v. White, No.  5:17-cv-138, 2019 U.S. Dist.  LEXIS 20486 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 8, 2019).  
134 A “kouplock” is a one-inch section of hair located at the base of the skull. 
135 Casey v. Davis, No. 2:14-CV-13, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232039, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 2017).  
136 Id. at *31.  
137 Id. at *36. 
138 Id. at 40-41.  
139 Cobb v. Morris, No. 2:14-CV-22, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23474 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2018). 
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In Ali v. Stephens, a Muslim prisoner challenged a grooming policy which prevented him from 
growing a beard not shorter than fist length, as required by his faith.140 In Ali, we actually see the 
court resolve a contested issue of fact in the prisoner’s favor, instead of the prison. Testimony 
regarding whether or not performing searches of beard hair was feasible such that prisoners could 
grow longer beards without posing greater security risk was a contested issue.141 The Fifth Circuit 
found that beard hair could be searched the same way as head hair, despite testimony to the 
contrary from the prison Warden.142 The court expressed that, “although we must respect a prison 
official’s expertise, the trial court in this case did not exceed its prerogative as a fact finder in 
resolving competing testimony in Ali’s favor where, as here, its finding was supported by 
testimony from both Ali’s experts and [the prison’s] own witness.143 Another important holding 
came in rejecting the prison’s cost control argument. The prison argued a flat ban was the least 
restrictive means of maintaining security because the extra time and money spent to search each 
Muslim inmate’s beard would be untenable.144 In a pre-Holt type of case, a court would typically 
accept this at face-value. Here, the court not only rejected the argument but did its own independent 
calculation of the exact amount that the prison could reasonably be expected to pay for the extra 
maintenance.145 The court noted that, the trial court was not “bound to accept TDCJ’s predictions 
in light of the speculative nature of the testimony of [] the witnesses.”146 A New Hampshire district 
court used the same reasoning to invalidate a grooming policy limiting beard lengths to one-quarter 
of an inch, finding the policy not to be the least restrictive means because the warden had not 
investigated how facilities without beard restrictions managed risks associated with longer 
 
140 Ali v. Stephens, 822 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2016).  
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 787. 
143 Id. at 789. 
144 Id. at 792. 
145 Id. at 793. 
146 Id.   
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beards.147 This kind of analysis from the court is markedly different than what one would have 
seen in a pre-Holt era, especially given that any kind of language signaling legislative intent to 
give deference to prison officials was not included in either opinion.  
ii. Objects 
The Holt decision did help RLUIPA challenges to regulations involving access to religious 
objects, but these claims are generally less successful even in a post-Holt era given that objects of 
any kind are inherently more dangerous to prison security and susceptible to abuse than restrictions 
concerning hair length. Especially with safety and security concerns including contraband 
smuggling, hidden weapons and illegal use, prisoners arguing for access to objects to be used in 
connection with religious services still face the uphill battle of legitimate security concerns. While 
the Holt court alluded to the idea of smuggling contraband in a one-half inch beard as laughable148, 
the same can’t necessarily be said to objects which prisoners have access to with limited to no 
supervision. That being said, the lack of blind acceptance to assertions from prison officials still 
allowed some claims in this area to succeed which would have previously been unsuccessful.  
A prime example is Greenhill v. Clarke, where the Fourth Circuit held that a prison 
restricting an inmate’s use of a television to participate in Jum’ah services to incentivize inmate 
participation in a program designed to improve behavior in confinement did not satisfy strict 
scrutiny.149 The court reasoned that “to be valid… [the prison] must address specifically why the 
denial of limited television access…is necessary to maintain order, security, discipline or to control 
costs.” In an identical television case, a Georgia district court used the same reasoning.150 Similarly 
 
147 Staples v. Gerry, No. 14-cv-473-JL, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86629, at *18 (D. New Hamp. May 11, 2015). 
148 Holt, 574 U.S. at 363 (“the argument that [the prison’s] interest would be seriously compromised by allowing an 
inmate to grow a one-half inch beard is hard to take seriously”).  
149 Greenhill v. Clarke, 944 F.3d 243, 250 (4th Cir. 2019).  
150 Knott v. McLaughlin, No. 5:17-cv-36, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51374, at *12 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2019) (finding 
defendant proffered no evidence to counter plaintiff’s proof that the prison allowed inmates to use the television for 
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in LaPlante v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr.,  a Massachusetts district court invalidated a prison’s ban on 
access to sacred herbs and teas, finding that the flat ban “require[d] more deference to the 
Defendants than is due to rule that their broad assertions carry the burden of proving that their flat 
denial of the…teas is the least restrictive means.”151 These courts used Holt to hold the institution 
to its burden of proof—something a pre-Holt court would likely not have done.   
Courts have also used Holt to allow prisoner access to religious objects in supervised 
situations. In Cox v.  Stephens, Native American prisoners were allowed use of medicine bags in 
cell areas and to and from religious services.152 In Anderson v. Dzurenda inmates were allowed to 
purchase religious objects for supervised use in their cells from a source selected by the prison.153 
The same was true for a prisoner wanting to possess an Islamic fezz while in his cell154, a kufi both 
inside and outside of the cell155 and even use of a kufi inside the cell as well as in the exercise 
yard156, as a flat ban on the use these objects in any of these areas was not proven to be the least 
restrictive means of quelling violence or improving safety and security by the prisons in any of 
these cases. These courts were able to use Holt to allow prisoners access to their sacred religious 
objects by removing the possibility of taking prison officials’ word as gospel on overly 
burdensome restrictions. By actually exploring the possibility of alternatives, inmates were 
actually able to see relief in this area.   
V. Analysis of Cases In Part IV  
 
 
other group activities in the common area which caused more tension than group prayer, and therefore the ban on 
using the television for prayer observance was not the least restrictive means). 
151 LaPlante v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 89 F. Supp. 3d 235, 247-48 (D. Mass. 2015).  
152 Cox v. Stephens, No. 2:13-CV-151, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39051, at *28-29 (S.D. Tx. Mar. 27, 2015).  
153 Anderson v. Dzurenda, No. 3:18-cv-00426, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136550, at *14 (D. Nev. Jul. 24, 2019).  
154 Marshall. v. Corbett, No. 3:13-cv-02961, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134520, at *22-23 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2019).  
155 Ajala v. West, 106 F. Supp. 3d 976, 981-82 (W.D. Wis. May 4, 2015).  
156 Harris v. Wall, 217 F. Supp. 3d 541, 559 (D. RI. Nov. 18, 2016).   
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Of course, RLUIPA claims are not impenetrable and some courts157 do remain legitimately 
concerned about the safety and security of American prisons. However, an analysis of RFRA cases 
and both pre-Holt and post-Holt RLUIPA cases clearly demonstrates that the Court’s decision in 
Holt breathed life into prisoner free exercise claims. After the Supreme Court’s clear mandate in 
Holt that courts were not to place great deference onto the testimony of prison wardens and 
officials, but rather must hold the institutions to their burden in evaluating the possibility of less 
restrictive alternatives, prisoners were finally able to bring successful challenges to overly 
burdensome prison regulations which restricted prisoners’ free exercise of religion.  
After Holt, bare assertions of a prison’s safety or security risk are no longer sufficient to 
withstand an RLUIPA attack. Testimony from a prison official that a proffered alternative would 
be unduly burdensome or impractical no longer passes muster in a post-Holt line of reasoning, as 
it was clear from Holt that prisons no longer receive unquestioned deference. In other words, all 
courts after the Holt decision was issued must actually apply and analyze claims under rigid strict 
scrutiny. As a result, post 2015, we see the court ruling in favor of prisoners where the institutional 
defendant had not explored alternatives or did not proffer proof that the alternatives would not 
further the institution’s goals. We even see some courts suggest their own less restrictive 
alternatives when finding in favor of the prisoner.   
 
157 See Blake v. Rubenstein, No. 2:08-cv-00906, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22073 (S.D. Wv. Mar. 17, 2009). (scented 
oils could completely mask occurrence of illicit activity and thus a ban was the least restrictive way to further 
security); Tanksley v. Litscher, No. 15-cv-126-jdp, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130340,  (W.D. Wis. Aug. 15, 2017) (a 
ban on tarot cards containing pornographic images was the least restrictive way to further security); Knight v. 
Thompson, 797 F.3d 934, 945 (11th Cir. 2015) (safety and security concerns in preventing gang-formation and hair 
pulling during fights as well as the concealment of weapons and contraband make the “off neck and ears haircut” 
policy the least restrictive means); Mounts v. Raemisch, No. 16-cv-02732-RBJ-KLM, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
159381, at *13 (D. Col. Sept. 19, 2019) (denial of prisoner’s access to religious fedora “at all times in all places” is 
the least restrictive means of furthering that security interest because the prisoner never proffered an alternative such 
as wearing the fedora in his cell or only during services).  
 26
An analysis of the relevant caselaw also demonstrates that prisoners experience the greatest 
amount of success in challenges to grooming regulations. While prisoners have experienced more 
success in the context of challenges to regulations involving access to religious objects than under 
RFRA and before Holt, this success is limited by the fact that objects are inherently more 
dangerous than hair and beard regulations. It is no surprise that certain foreign objects, whether 
associated with religious use or not, pose unique security risks and could be subject to abuse by 
inmates. Put simply, Holt can only be stretched so far—some religious objects do realistically pose 
safety and security threats, and this cannot be ignored no matter how little deference a court gives 
to the opinion of prison officials. With the correct application of strict scrutiny, RLUIPA is now 
working precisely how it should be—by restricting religious exercise when such restriction really 
is the least burdensome way to achieve important state interests like keeping inmates and prison 
officials safe. It is undoubtedly harder for a court to justify the use of scalding rocks and wood 
beams for use in building a religious sweat lodge, when these items can so easily be used to incite 
violence or cause injury. Even in light of this, after Holt courts are more likely to allow prisoner 
access to objects for religious use under supervised conditions, or in limited areas of the prison. In 
a pre-Holt era, a court would be far more likely to uphold a flat ban on use of objects. Famously 
said, “prisoners do not abandon their constitutional rights at the prison door.”158 The Holt decision 
has helped this ring true in the context of prisoner free exercise claims, and prisoners no longer 
face an uphill battle to freely—and safely—practice and exercise their religious freedom inside 
prison doors.  
 
158 Salahuddin v. Goord, 476 F.3d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 2006). 
